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ELECTION LAW SYMPOSIUM
SPEECH
REGULATION AND THE DECLINE OF
GRASSROOTS POLITICS
Bradley A. Smith'
I want to begin by congratulating and thanking the Editorial Board of
the Catholic University Law Review for hosting this symposium and,
more importantly, for its commitment to devote one issue each year to
election law. This decision both advances and validates the importance
of election law as its own field of study.
Since Baker v. Carr' was decided in 1962, election law cases have been
a growing staple of the Supreme Court's docket. In recent years, the Su-
preme Court has decided a host of high profile constitutional cases in-
volving the Voting Rights Act,2 term limits, 3 party rights,4 ballot access
rights,' campaign finance,6 gerrymandering,' and patronage." These deci-
+ Commissioner, Federal Election Commission; Professor of Law, Capital University Law
School (on leave). This is a lightly cited version of the keynote speech delivered at the Catholic
University Low Review's Election Law Symposium hosted on September 23, 2000. Victoria Wu
assisted with editing and citations. The views expressed herein are to be attributed solely to the
author and not to the Federal Election Commission or its Commissioners.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (1999); Lopez v. Monterey
County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999).
3. See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
4. See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214
(1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986); Democratic Party of
the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
5. See, e.g., Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999);
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968).
6. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000); Colo. Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 459 U.S. 87 (1996); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam).
7. See, e.g.,*Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
8. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs, Waubansee County v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996);
O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Rutan v. Republican
Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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sions increasingly shape our political lives. Nevertheless, constitutional
law courses devote less and less time to the important First and Four-
teenth Amendment issues raised by these cases, and courses on legisla-
tion are too full to devote space to exploring the way in which the
Court's decisions in this area of law shape our democracy. The creation
of a regular forum to study this field, in one of the nation's top law jour-
nals, is an important step in assisting scholars, politicians, activists, and
the Court itself to understand the impact that the Court has had.
We come together today in the midst of a presidential election in
which we hope that the turnout among eligible voters will exceed fifty
percent, but are less than certain that it will. Voter turnout in northern
states has declined twenty percentage points since the end of the last cen-
tury, and nearly fifteen percentage points just since 1960.' This is not
cause for alarm in and of itself, and I for one do not look to voter turnout
as a leading indicator of political health. In fact, as I have noted else-
where, the United States has as strong a claim as any to be the healthiest
democratic republic in the world."' Nevertheless, I will admit to nagging
doubts about our political future, for I fear that these declining vote to-
tals represent a steady disengagement of Americans from political life. It
is a disengagement that I see in my students and in my neighbors. It is a
disengagement that is summarized in the political clich6s of our times:
"all politicians are corrupt;" "they all do it;" "there's not a dime's worth
of difference between the parties." It is one thing-a healthy thing-for
citizens to turn away from politics as the solution to all problems. But it
is something else-and something unhealthy for a democracy-when
disillusioned citizens turn away from informed political debate, discus-
sion, and participation.
Several culprits are offered for this state of affairs. Perhaps the most
ubiquitous is high spending and the alleged corruption of "big money" in
the system. Others, however, blame negative campaigning, or the lack of
third party alternatives (or more refined, the absence of third party can-
didates from nationally televised debates). Still, others blame the educa-
tional system or broad cultural shifts. All of these factors may play a
role. However, I would like us to consider placing a portion of the blame
on a somewhat different culprit: regulation, and, in particular, campaign
finance regulation.
9. See FEC, National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960-1996 (visited Oct. 12,
2000) <http://www.fec.gov/pages/htmlto5.htm>.
10. See Bradley A. Smith, Some Problems with Taxpayer-Funded Political Cam-
paigns, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 591 (1999).
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Before I get into particulars, however, I want to note that the growth
of regulation generally, or more precisely, the growth of the administra-
tive state, is itself smothering democracy in America, not only in its par-
ticulars, but in its general, ubiquitous presence. For example, in the 2000
fall election, control of the United States House of Representatives is up
for grabs, with the two major parties racing neck and neck to gain a ma-
jority. A difference of just a few seats will mean a difference of who sets
the agenda, who chairs the committees. Yet the elections generate little
enthusiasm. The lack of enthusiasm is not, as some claim, because there
is no difference between the parties. There is substantial difference be-
tween the parties, on issues as diverse as gun control, healthcare, social
security reform, education policy, taxes, and more. Furthermore, party
voting is more reliable now than it was forty years ago, when the great
decline in participation began. Tell me a congressman's position on a
half dozen issues, and with considerable accuracy I can tell you his party.
Yet voters may be correct if they anticipate no significant difference in
the policies that might result from Democratic or Republican control of
the House and Senate. The rise of the administrative state has not ren-
dered Congress irrelevant, but it has rendered Congress of secondary
importance in terms of actual governance. Tens of thousands of career
bureaucrats effectively control the nation's government. When elections
are made relatively unimportant by the handing off of power to an
unelected bureaucracy, should we be surprised that voter turnout falls?
Let us consider, for example, one matter of particular interest to those
of us here. On September 28, 2000, the Federal Election Commission
(FEC), at an open meeting, discussed an in-progress rulemaking that
would ban so-called "soft money" through the Commission's regulations.
Now, in each of the last several sessions of Congress, bills have been
carefully considered and voted on to do just that. These bills have not
passed. This bit of rulemaking began with a petition for rulemaking from
five members of Congress who favor such a ban but have been unable to
achieve their goals in Congress. Let me read from the comments submit-
ted to the FEC by Representatives Shays and Meehan, the primary spon-
sors of the House Bill to ban soft money, and two of the Congressmen
asking the FEC to act: "[w]hile we have been working to enact meaning-
ful campaign finance reform through the legislative process and intend to
continue pursuing this, our efforts should not hinder the FEC from
moving forward simultaneously. The 'soft money' system should be
ceased in any way possible.""
11. Representatives Campbell, Meehan, Moran, and Shays, and the Brennan Center
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In other words, having failed to secure the legislation they would like
through the legislative process, they came to us, the unelected bureauc-
racy, and asked us to pass the legislation for them. But if the losing side
in Congress can enact its will simply by turning to the unelected bureauc-
racy, why should citizens bother to vote for members of Congress?
Of course, it might be argued that we at the Federal Election Commis-
sion are appointed by the President, subject to the consent of the Senate,
so that even if what I say is true, at least the presidential races still ought
to matter. Yet the presidential appointees at the top of the alphabet
soup of federal agencies also have little power to affect change. For ex-
ample, at my little agency, the FEC, we have about 350 full time equiva-
lents. But just sixteen of these employees, if I've counted correctly, are
directly accountable to the Commissioners." Virtually all the work is
done by permanent staff, and the system all but assures that most policy
determinations will be made by that staff. All.that the agency heads can
do is hope to catch a handful of egregious cases that run most directly
counter to the policy goals of the administrators, or periodically engage
in the cumbersome rulemaking process-a process that will ultimately
yield new rules to be largely interpreted and enforced by the professional
staff. It is not that the staff is incompetent, or venal, or even that it tries
to frustrate the policy goals of the administrators. It is simply that the
staff is dominant.
If the rise of the administrative state has generally taken much of the
meaning out of politics, the specific regulation of politics has also been
geared toward discouraging public participation. For example, gerry-
mandering makes districts less competitive, giving voters less reason to
go to the polls. Although gerrymandering has been with us from the
earliest days of our Republic, advancements in computer technology
have made it more ubiquitous and effective in recent decades. Perhaps
all this is unavoidable, But in addition, we now have the Voting Rights
Act, which actually encourages gerrymandering in order to create safe
"majority-minority" seats. In other words, in order to assure minority
representation in the legislature, we have created a system that all but
for Justice at NYU School of Law, Comments at a Hearing on Soft Money, Federal Elec-
tion Commission (Nov. 18,1998).
12. Each of the six Commissioners has two personal staff positions-a law clerk and
an administrative assistant. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman each get a second law
clerk, and a majority of the Commissioners may vote to hire and fire the Agency's General
Counsel and Staff Director. Two Commissioners, including the author, have tried to bol-
ster policymaking and research capability by foregoing an administrative assistant and
hiring a second (underpaid) lawyer in the position.
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requires state legislatures to make more districts electorally noncompeti-
tive. Given the lofty goals of the Voting Rights Act and its success in in-
creasing the number of racial minority members in Congress, perhaps
this is a price worth paying.
Can the same be said, however, of ballot access or, especially, cam-
paign finance regulation? State laws regulating ballot access still remain
far more restrictive than any legitimate state interests would require.'3
These laws reduce the options available to voters and require independ-
ent and third party candidates to devote substantial resources to the ef-
fort to qualify for the ballot, rather than to discussions of the issues that
might actually bring voters to the polls.
Campaign finance regulation is doing even more damage to our sys-
tem. The fact is, this regulation is having a devastating effect on grass-
roots political activity in this country. A short time ago I had lunch with
James Buckley, the last United States Senator elected on a third party
ticket, and the lead plaintiff in Buckley v. Valeo.4 Absent the Buckley
decision, of course, campaign speech would be much more heavily regu-
lated than it is. Buckley, fortunately, struck down limits on both candi-
date and independent expenditures, 5 and limited the reach of regulation
to contributions and expenditures that explicitly advocate the election or
defeat of a candidate for federal office-as opposed to the original lan-
guage of the 1974 Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act,
which would have regulated any speech "relative to" a candidate for of-
fice, a vague standard that could have been used to regulate most all po-
litical discussion in America. 6 Nevertheless, Buckley left intact many of
the core portions of the FECA, most notably disclosure requirements
and contribution limits,' 7 plus a tax-financed system of presidential elec-
tions that allows governments to stack the deck in favor of candidates
who "voluntarily" agree to limit their spending.Y
What Mr. Buckley drove home to me over lunch, however, was that a
campaign such as he ran in 1970 for a U.S. Senate seat from New York-
13. See generally Bradley A. Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot Access Rights, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167 (1991).
14. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
15. Id. at 58-59.
16. Id. at 44 & n.52 (describing the express advocacy standard).
17. Id. at 84 (upholding the disclosure requirements).
18. Id. at 99 (upholding voluntary limits on public funding); see also Office of Secre-
tary of State Rebecca McDowell Cook, Proposed "Proposition B", Missouri Initiative Pe-
tition, Fall, 2000 (visited Oct. 20, 2000) <http:l/mosl.sos.state.mo.us/sos-elec/campref.html>
(petition to penalize candidates who opt out of public funding by crediting participating
candidates amounts equal to that of the nonparticipants).
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one of the most expensive states in which to run, of course-would be
impossible today. It is nearly impossible for a third party candidate to
raise the money needed to be competitive with today's contribution lim-
its, unless the candidate is self-funded, as with Ross Perot. Third parties,
almost by definition, begin the campaign lacking the broad base of sup-
port of the major parties. Thus, they find it especially difficult to raise
enough money in small contributions to reach the mass of voters.
Furthermore, campaign finance regulation has limited the time avail-
able for the type of grassroots politicking that Mr. Buckley engaged in.
The time that candidates must devote to fundraising-due to low contri-
bution limits-cuts into their ability to campaign on the trail.
Moreover, the web of regulation we have spun cuts down the truest
grassroots activity. Mr. Buckley related to me how, back in those heady,
"corrupt," pre-FECA days, his campaign would sometimes swing
through a small town in upstate New York, and find a "Buckley for Sen-
ate" headquarters totally unknown to the campaign itself. Enthusiastic
conservatives, on their own initiative, would have rented a small store-
front, written to the Buckley campaign for literature, and set up their
own "Buckley for Senate" operation in their town or city.
Today, such activity would require these politically motivated indi-
viduals to hire a lawyer, establish themselves as a political committee,
and begin filling out burdensome reports to the Federal Election Com-
mission. These reports require the tracking not only of cash contribu-
tions, but of cash advances-for example, to rent a hall-that are later
repaid, and of many in-kind contributions. The required disclosure
means that donors would lose their anonymity-often highly valued if for
no other reason than to keep other fundraisers at bay-in the process.
Contributions from individuals are limited, and from corporations
banned. Use of corporate premises for any purpose, even in the case of
small, family owned corporations, can ensnare the corporation in a web
of regulation and enforcement. The careless volunteer who passes the
hat at a meeting places both the Committee and the donor in potential
difficulty if anonymous contributions exceed $50'9 or any cash contribu-
tions top $100.2o On top of all this, the unwise individual who might vol-
unteer to serve as treasurer for such a committee is personally liable for
violations of the FECA by the Committee or its volunteers.21 Is it any
wonder that there is a shortage of spontaneous grassroots political activ-
19. See 2 U.S.C. §441g (1994), 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(c)(3) (2000).
20. See 2 U.S.C. § 432(c)(2) (1994), 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(c).
21. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.14(d).
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ity?
For these same reasons, the campaigns themselves will discourage local
volunteer activity. Volunteers tend to be ignorant of the regulations.
Thus, to assure compliance and avoid enforcement actions and penalties,
campaigns centralize their activity, and this centralization snuffs out local
activity and concentrates the campaign into television and radio adver-
tising, which can be controlled from the headquarters.
The destruction of local politicking is at its worst in presidential cam-
paigns, in which publicly funded candidates also agree to overall spend-
ing limits. Because they have done so, no fundraising takes place locally.
Thus, in this year's presidential race, many states will see little cam-
paigning. States such as Utah, Nebraska, and Texas, where Republican
nominee George W. Bush has a lock on the electorate, or Massachusetts
and Rhode Island, where Al Gore is an overwhelming favorite, will see
little of the presidential campaign. In the old days, by contrast, state par-
ties would run their own campaigns in support of the national ticket, and
local party activists and volunteers had an incentive to "show their stuff"
even if the national campaign was ignoring the area. A similar problem
exists in the presidential primaries, where local volunteers are denied
funds in order for the national campaign to concentrate them in states
deemed more essential. I have heard local directors and volunteers
complain that they could raise funds in their states to campaign, but are
unable to do so due to the restrictions on the fundraising and expendi-
tures and the centralized decisionmaking that results.
Meanwhile, in the press, and in the offices of special interest lobbying
groups such as Common Cause, the FEC is often derided as a toothless
tiger. Some of this is intentional overstatement intended to dramatize
the purported need for the type of heavy-handed regulation such groups
and many reporters favor, but much of it is honest perception. I can tell
you, however, that this is not the perception that exists out beyond the
Washington beltway, where local candidates and campaign managers and
treasurers often find the FEC to be quite a fierce beast.
In the heated reporting of the press over who has raised how much,
and how very awful it is that people affected by government policy might
actually support a candidate financially, we tend to overlook what this
sort of regulation means to most Americans. For example, shortly after I
joined the FEC, we were presented with the General Counsel's recom-
mendation in MUR 4978," involving a candidate for Congress down in
22. MUR stands for "Matter Under Review," the designation the FEC gives to com-
plaints under investigation.
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Texas by the name of Mac Warren. Warren is a retired Army officer and
veterinarian who had the gall to run for Congress this spring. In his
campaign, he spent approximately $40,000, of which about $20,000 was
his own money, and he finished fourth in a four-way race, with about
eighteen percent of the vote. About $5,000 was spent on two pieces of
campaign literature: a brochure that stated in bold letters, "Vote Mac
Warren," and listed the campaign's address, and a card that listed the
campaign's address in two places and asked for contributions to "Mac
Warren for Congress." But neither piece included the disclaimer re-
quired by 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a), clearly stating who paid for the communi-
cation and whether it was authorized by the candidate or his committee.
As is typically the case, we received a transparently phony complaint
about these pieces from a "concerned citizen," who wrote, "I would like
to know who is really funding this." The campaign's only defense was
inexperience, haste, and a plea for leniency. The General Counsel's of-
fice recommended a $2,500 fine. Although I was unsuccessful in urging
my colleagues on the Commission to vote for no fine at all-seeing no
deterrent effect here-the Commission did settle this matter for $1000.
It was our way of saying, "Thank you, Mr. Warren, for participating in
American democracy. Here's your bill."
This is not an atypical case. For example, in another recent matter, not
yet public, a candidate borrowed several thousand dollars from a bank
and then loaned the amount to his campaign. However, because his
spouse had co-signed the note, the law attributed half of the contribution
to her, placing both her and the campaign in violation of the $1000 limit
on contributions. Of course, if we're going to get serious about prevent-
ing spouses from corrupting candidates, we probably need to give the
Commission far more power, including the authority to enjoin spouses
from sleeping together.
I could go on and on in this vein. But I would summarize by saying
that what I've seen at the Commission in my first three months are a
number of complaints that don't violate the law; many that may violate
the law; and some that definitely do violate the law. What I have not
seen are many, if any, cases having anything to do with preventing cor-
ruption, or even the appearance of corruption-which, if you remember
Buckley, is the compelling state interest that allows any of these speech
restrictive measures to withstand constitutional scrutiny at all."3
Indeed, most complaints that we receive are filed by political partisans.
One of the problems with all this regulation is that the regulation itself
23. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.
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has become a campaign weapon. Charges and litigation are used to har-
ass opposing candidates and make political hay with the press. Needless
to say, incumbents and national committees, who have more experience,
use these tactics most effectively against inexperienced candidates. But
they also use them against each other. For example, at this time of year
we can see each of the major parties systematically filing charges against
many of the other party's nominees in those fifty or so House races that
are truly competitive. Many, if not most, of these cases end up being
dismissed, but not without distracting the campaigns and using up their
resources. Just as the impact of these charges and countercharges falls
most heavily on inexperienced candidates, it also falls more heavily on
small campaigns and groups than it does on big business, which may help
explain why some big business groups have joined the cry to regulate the
speech of their friends, neighbors, and countrymen.
The idea that all this regulation is ending "corruption" or promoting
"equality" is almost laughable on its face. Nobody seriously argues that
special interests-whatever that term might mean-have less influence
now than they did before we embarked on the path of political regulation
thirty years ago. The old canard is that businesses must be getting quid
pro quo favors, or why would they give to parties and campaigns? But
businesses spend roughly ten times as much on lobbying as they do on
campaign contributions, and they give away roughly ten times as much to
charity as they spend on all lobbying and campaign giving combined-so
perhaps we ought not to assume that there is no other explanation.24 The
plain and simple fact is that research shows, over and over, that campaign
contributions just aren't that important.
25
The end result is that regulation has helped the powerful who have the
resources to cope with it, and created an ever more distant political class
of fundraisers, consultants, accountants, and lawyers who know how to
negotiate the web of restrictions and limits on political activity. This is
one reason why Mr. Charles Kolb, current president of the Committee
for Economic Development (CED), can say quite honestly, as he has,
24. Jeffrey Milyo et al., Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective, in 2
BUSINESS AND POLITICS 75 (2000).
25. See, e.g., W.P. Welch, Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk
Money and Dairy Price Supports, 35 W. POL. Q. 478, 479 (1982) ("The influence of contri-
butions is small, at least relative to the influence of constituency, party and ideology.");
John R. Wright, PACs, Contributions, Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective, 79 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 400, 411 (1985) ("[T]he ability of PACs to use their campaign contribu-
tions to influence congressional voting is severely constrained .... Of the numerous vari-
ables that influence the voting behavior of congressmen, the campaign contributions of
PACs appear to take effect infrequently.").
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that the type of big businesses represented by the CED don't worry
about a loss of influence due to added restrictions on their giving. The
other, as Mr. Kolb has made plain, is because their influence really
comes from lobbying.26 As I've noted, big business in the United States
spends roughly ten times as much on lobbying as it does on all campaign
contributions and soft money donations combined. But for the average
person-or even the typical rich person-and for most smaller busi-
nesses, union locals, and decentralized associations, political giving is the
primary method they have of participating in politics. And as we have
seen, the political activity of grassroots groups often suffers most when
we start regulating their activities.
For example, this spring the Congress hurriedly passed into law a bill
intended to regulate what the regulatory lobby had dubbed "stealth
PACs." The labeling was a wonderful thing-people don't really know
what PACs are, but they know from years of propaganda that PACs are
very bad." And stealth? Well, only burglars and sneaks are stealthy. So
a "stealth PAC" must be very bad, indeed. The alleged problem here
was that many people were able to talk about political issues without re-
vealing their full identity-sort of like the writers of the Federalist Pa-
pers, who wrote under the pseudonym "Publius," or Thomas Jefferson
and Abraham Lincoln, who anonymously subsidized partisan newspa-
pers, or other corrupt politicians from the dark days of unregulated, pre-
FECA political speech. This spring's "527 legislation"-so called be-
cause it was aimed at groups operating under Section 527 of the Tax
Code, which exempts the contributions and interest income of groups or-
ganized for political purposes from taxation-was intended to force these
groups to disclose their donors.
The result, however, was not to snare big fish. Many of the biggest
players simply used their money and expertise to reorganize under other
sections of the Tax Code. However, nearly 10,000 groups-most of them
small campaign organizations established for candidates for county
clerks, state judges, and other state officials-have been forced to regis-
ter and report on their activties to the federal government. 8
Even when the big fish have kept their 527 status and filed reports,
what have we really learned? We learned from the filing of the Sierra
26. See generally THOMAS GAIS, IMPROPER INFLUENCE: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LAWS, POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS, AND THE PROBLEM OF EQUALITY (1996).
27. See Bradley A. Smith, A Most Uncommon Cause: Some Thoughts on Campaign
Reform and a Response to Professor Paul, 30 CONN. L. REV. 831, 834 (1998).
28. See generally Lance Gay, Campaign Finance Law Misses Target, Catches Small-
town Politicians in Net, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2000, at A8.
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Club, for example, (and by the way, there's a "stealth" group with a hid-
den agenda if I've ever seen one) that a gentleman from San Francisco
named William Hambrecht gave the group $50,000 in July. Could this be
the same William Hambrecht who is head of the San Francisco invest-
ment banking firm, WR Hambrecht & Co., a six figure donor to the
Democratic Party, and a major underwriter of the liberal on-line maga-
zine Salon as well? And if so, don't we all feel better knowing the real
agenda of the Sierra Club? I can look at the Sierra Club ads now with a
more skeptical eye, knowing that they are really just shilling for the in-
vestment banking industry, and promoting a liberal agenda. I used to
think that they were merely conservative environmentalists.
It is a sad fact of American jurisprudence that laws regulating flag
burning," topless dancing,3° and internet porn3" are now subjected to a
higher standard of judicial scrutiny than political speech.32 And for
what? After a quarter century of heavy-handed regulation, voter turnout
is down, special interest influence seems to be up, grassroots politicking
is fading away, campaigns are longer than ever, candidates spend more
time fundraising than ever, incumbents are more entrenched than ever,
and political debate has been reduced to french-kissing one's spouse on
national television and being Oprah's pal.33 "But," say the purveyors of
speech regulation, "if the results have not been good, it is only because
the Herculean task has just begun. We must redouble our efforts. We
must ensnare those groups that avoided our 527 regulation; we must
regulate more. We must limit, fine, and penalize. And then all will be
well. We will weed out corruption, and have true political equality." But
I would suggest to you that campaign finance regulation is like Franken-
stein's monster: well-intentioned, but hopelessly misguided and ulti-
mately irredeemable, yet impossible to kill, and creating havoc wherever
it goes.34
29. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
30. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
31. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
32. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000); see also D. Bruce
La Pierre, Campaign Contribution Limits: Pandering to Public Fears About "Big Money"
and Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L.J. 687 (2000).
33. See Caryn James, When a Kiss Isn't a Kiss, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2000, at 4;
Alison Mitchell, The 2000 Campaign. The Texas Governor; Full of Banter, Bush Goes on
the 'Oprah' Circuit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2000, at 22.
34. See The Man Who Ruined Politics, Editorial, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1995, at A20
(analogy to Frankenstein's monster); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemo-
cratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996); Nixon, 120
S. Ct. at 914-16 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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In my lifetime I have been fortunate enough to see socialism die as an
economic theory. But the socialist impulse to control and to regulate
remains powerful. Indeed, for many it remains the driving passion of
life. But we know that socialist societies became more corrupt societies,
not less corrupt societies, as power is often arbitrarily lodged in the
hands of government officials. And we know that the effort to create
economic equality merely impoverished all-all, at least, save a small
elite at the top of society. So too, efforts to socialize our political dia-
logue through regulation are leading to increased corruption, added
power for a select elite at the top, and an impoverished political life for
the rest of us.
In the papers that follow, Dr. Edwards further discusses, in the context
of "soft money," some of the ways in which campaign finance regulation
distorts and impoverishes our political life. Professor Eastman and Mr.
Jowers demonstrate some of the errors in constitutional analysis that are
creating these problems. And although I disagree with the conclusions
that Mr. Kolb reaches, he too, brings important insights to the debate.
Mr. Kolb suggests that the problem in campaign finance is that unethical
politicians are threatening private actors, rather than that unethical spe-
cial interests are threatening government. If he is correct-and to the ex-
tent there is a problem, I think that he is-then our approach to regula-
tion, and indeed the entire rationale for constitutional tolerance of our
existing regulatory regime, must be questioned. And that would be an
important first step in rejuvenating American political life.
[Vol. 50:1
